Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., June 27, 2006 (Statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Prof. of Law, Geo. U. L. Center) by Rosenkranz, Nicholas Quinn
Georgetown University Law Center
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW
2006
Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong., June 27,
2006 (Statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz,
Prof. of Law, Geo. U. L. Center)
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz
Georgetown University Law Center, nqr@law.georgetown.edu
CIS No.: 2007-H521-18
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from:
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/23
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author.
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Courts Commons
  
 
 
 
 
Testimony of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz 
 
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center 
Hearing: Presidential Signing Statements Under the Bush Administration 
June 27, 2006  
U.S. House Judiciary Committee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 
January 31, 2007 
 
Mr. Chairman, Representative Smith, Members of the Committee: I thank you for the 
opportunity to express my views about presidential signing statements. I will use my time 
in an attempt to separate out the various structural constitutional issues raised by signing 
statements. As you know, there has been significant confusion on this topic in the popular 
press; I hope that by disaggregating the various issues and discussing them 
dispassionately, we may at a minimum dispel some of the more hysterical assertions that 
have found their way into print. 
 
In addition, the Committee may be interested in possible legislative responses to the 
President's use of signing statements. As you know, Representative Jackson Lee has 
already introduced a bill to regulate the creation and use of signing statements.2 
Likewise, Senator Specter introduced a somewhat similar bill last summer,3 which may 
also be of interest to the Committee. Therefore, I will address the constitutionality and the 
structural desirability of these and other possible legislative measures. I should mention 
that I testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee on this same topic last summer,4 
and I will be drawing substantially from that prior testimony today (in Parts I-III). I 
should also say that I largely agree with the position put forth by Deputy Assistant 
Attorney General Michelle Boardman at that hearing,5 and I commend her testimony to 
this Committee. 
 
As Ms. Boardman explained, this President's signing statements have not differed 
significantly from those of his recent predecessors. And in any event, as I shall explain, 
presidential signing statements are an entirely appropriate means by which the President 
fulfills his constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." 
 
I. Executive Interpretation 
 
The most important and most common function of presidential signing statements is to 
announce to the Executive Branch and to the public the President's interpretation of the 
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law.8 The propriety of such an announcement should be obvious. There is an oft- 
repeated canard that the President has no business interpreting federal statutes his job is 
to execute the laws, and interpretation should be left to the courts.10 A moment's 
reflection reveals that this view is unsound. It is simply impossible, as a matter of logic, 
to execute a law without determining what it means. 
 
A. Informing the Executive Branch of the President's Interpretation 
 
Imagine, for example, a statute that imposes a tariff on the importation of "vegetables." 
Comes an eighteen-wheeler full of tomatoes. Is a tomato a vegetable? At the end of the 
day, maybe the Supreme Court will decide,11 but long before then, the executive branch 
is put to a choice: stop the truck at the border or let it through. There is no ducking the 
question; either choice implies an interpretation of the statute, an interpretation of the 
word "vegetable." And the President cannot simply flip a coin. He has a constitutional 
duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,"12 and this faithfulness 
inherently and inevitably includes a good faith effort to determine what "the Laws" mean. 
In short, as the Supreme Court has explained, "[i]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress 
to implement the legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law." 
 
Nor is the President obliged to leave the choice to individual Border Patrol agents. The 
Supreme Court has rightly said that the President can and should "supervise and guide 
[executive officers'] construction of the statutes under which they act in order to secure 
that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which Article II of the Constitution 3 14 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). 15 The Legal Significance of 
Presidential Signing Statements, 17 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 131, 132 (1993) 
[hereinafter OLC Signing Statements Memorandum]. 16 See Frank B. Cross, The 
Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of Presidential "Signing Statements", 40 
ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 227-28 (1988) (arguing that the President's decision to announce 
his interpretation of a statute in a signing statement beneficially increases the 
transparency of executive branch decision-making); Lederman et al., supra note 9 ("The 
signing statement is a good thing: a manifestation of the Executive's intentions that helps 
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us to understand the heart of the problem. . . . [I]t is much better that [the President] tell 
Congress and the public of his intentions, rather than keep it secret . . . ."); see also John 
E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance with Legal 
Standards, 70 VA. L. REV. 965 (1984) (analyzing the types of costs arising from 
uncertainty about legal rules); Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 789, 822-36 (2002) (analyzing the costs that arise from uncertainty when 
new statutes are enacted and the importance of interpretive rules for reducing that 
uncertainty). 17 Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (per curiam) ("Sunlight is 
said to be the best of disinfectants . . . .") (quoting LOUIS DEMBITZ BRANDEIS, 
OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY (1933)). 18 OLC Signing Statements Memorandum, supra 
note 15, at 132. 19 See, e.g., Statement on Signing the Veterans Health Programs 
Improvement Act of 2004, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2886 (November 30, 
2004) ("The executive branch shall construe the repeal, in section evidently contemplated 
in vesting general executive power in the President alone."14 And as Walter Dellinger, 
Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel under President Clinton, has 
explained, this is a "generally uncontroversial . . . function of presidential signing 
statements" "to guide and direct executive officials in interpreting or administering a 
statute."15 
 
B. Informing the Public of the President's Interpretation 
 
Of course, the President need not make his interpretations public; he could quietly 
instruct the U.S. Border Patrol that a tomato is a vegetable and have done with it. But 
there are many good reasons why, in most circumstances, a public statement of 
interpretation is desirable. First, if the President's interpretation is public, then those who 
believe that his interpretation is erroneous can better and more quickly structure a 
challenge in court. Second, a public statement of interpretation reduces legal uncertainty; 
if people know the President's interpretation, they are better able to organize their affairs 
accordingly.16 Third, and perhaps most important, a public statement informs Congress 
of the President's interpretation, and if Congress disagrees, it may pass a bill clarifying 
the matter. 
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In short, in the United States, we have a strong preference for sunlight in government.17 
Once it is clear that interpreting the law is essential to executing it, there can be no 
independent objection to the President making his interpretations public. This is the 
primary function of presidential signing statements, and President Clinton's Office of 
Legal Counsel was quite right to call this function "uncontroversial."18 
 
II. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
 
The President interprets statutes in much the same way that courts do, with the same 
panoply of tools and strategies. His lawyers carefully study the text and structure of Acts 
of Congress,19 aided perhaps by dictionaries, linguistic treatises, and other tools of . . . 
which provides for opening of an item of a class of mail otherwise sealed against 
inspection, in a manner consistent, to the maximum extent permissible, with the need to 
conduct searches in exigent circumstances . . . .") (emphasis added); Statement on 
Signing the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, 42 
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 425 (March 9, 2006) ("The executive branch shall 
construe the provisions of H.R. 3199 that call for furnishing information to entities 
outside the executive branch . . . in a manner consistent with the President's constitutional 
authority to . . . withhold information the disclosure of which would impair foreign 
relations, national security, the deliberative statutory interpretation. In addition, just like 
courts, they also apply well-established maxims of statutory interpretation, called canons. 
 
One canon in particular is of interest today. As Justice Holmes explained in 1927, "[T]he 
rule is settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it 
would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which 
will save the Act."21 This is known as the canon of constitutional avoidance,22 and it "is 
followed out of respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of 
constitutional limitations." 
 
This is the canon that the President is applying when he says, in signing statements, that 
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he will construe a particular provision to be consistent with a particular constitutional 
command.24 Many of the presidential signing statements that have most exercised the 
press have taken this form,25 so it is crucial to understand what these processes of the 
Executive, or the performance of the Executive's constitutional duties. . . . The executive 
branch shall construe section 756(e)(2) of H.R. 3199 . . . in a manner consistent with the 
President's constitutional authority to supervise the unitary executive branch and to 
recommend for the consideration of the Congress such measures as he judges necessary 
and expedient.") (emphasis added); Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, 
and Pandemic Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918 (December 
30, 2005) ("The executive branch shall construe Title X in Division A of the Act, relating 
to detainees, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the President to 
supervise the unitary executive branch and as Commander in Chief and consistent with 
the constitutional limitations on the judicial power . . . .") (emphasis added). 
 
They do not "amount to partial vetoes."27 They do not "declare[ the President's] intention 
not to enforce anything he dislikes."28 And they do not declare that the statutes enacted 
by Congress are unconstitutional. In fact, they declare exactly the opposite. As President 
Clinton's Office of Legal Counsel has explained, these sorts of signing statements are 
"analogous to the Supreme Court's practice of construing statutes, if possible, to avoid 
holding them unconstitutional . . . ."29 What these signing statements say, in effect, is 
that if an ambiguity appears on the face of the statute or becomes apparent in the course 
of execution, and if one possible meaning of the statute would render it unconstitutional, 
then the President will presume that Congress intended the other, constitutional meaning 
and he will faithfully enforce the statute so understood. 
 
Again, this amounts to nothing more than a straightforward application of a canon of 
statutory construction that was already well established when Justice Holmes elaborated 
it in 1927,31 a canon that finds its entire rationale in "a just respect for the legislature" 
and the faithfulness of Representatives and Senators to their constitutional oaths. If a 
statute is ambiguous, we the President, the Court, the People presume that Congress 
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intended it to be constitutional. 
 
Now, it may be argued that this canon has grown too strong. After all, it is not used 
merely as a tie-breaker for ambiguous statutes. Even if dictionaries or other canons point 
in the opposite direction, the canon of constitutional avoidance sometimes wins the day. 
As the Supreme Court explained in 1895, "every reasonable construction must be 
resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality,"35 and reasonable people 
may differ on what constitutes a reasonable construction. Moreover, the Supreme Court 
has held that "[a] statute must be construed, if possible, so as to avoid not only the 
conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon that score." This aspect 
of the doctrine is of more recent vintage38 and has been subject to quite compelling 
critique. 
 
For present purposes, though, it suffices to note that the President's application of this 
canon has been consistent with the interpretive doctrine espoused by the Court. If there is 
any plausible interpretation of a statute that would avoid a serious constitutional question, 
the President like the Court gives Congress the benefit of the doubt and adopts the 
constitutional interpretation. 
 
III. Presidential Signing Statements in Court 
 
An entirely separate issue is whether presidential signing statements are relevant to 
judicial interpretation of statutes. Courts sometimes use legislative history to resolve 
ambiguities in statutes41 (though this practice has been subject to withering criticism). 
 
The issue here is whether courts can and should put presidential signing statements to 
analogous use. There are strong arguments on both sides of this question. On the one 
hand, one might say that judicial interpretation of statutes should seek to discover 
legislative intent, and the President is not a legislator. The President's power over bills is 
the power to "approve"43 or disapprove legislation; it is a simple, binary, up-or-down 
decision, subsequent to, and distinct from, the legislative process. Indeed, the 
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Constitution makes clear that even though the veto power appears in Article I, it is not 
legislative power. The Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,"44 not a Congress and a President. 
And it is "[t]he Congress," not the Congress plus the President, who "shall have Power . . 
. To make all Laws." 
 
On the other hand, one might say that this is an unduly formalistic view of the legislative 
process. In reality, the administration often drafts legislation, and even when it does not, 
the entire legislative machinery operates in the shadow of the President's veto power.46 
On this view, the President's understanding of a bill as reflected in a signing statement is 
at least as important as the understanding of Congress reflected in legislative history. 
Moreover, any effort to glean the intent of Congress from legislative history is arguably 
quixotic: first, it is difficult to know how many Representatives and Senators agreed with 
any given portion of legislative history;47 and second, it is arguably incoherent to attempt 
to aggregate those individual intentions into a collective intent.48 By contrast, the 
President is just a single person, so his interpretive statement poses none of those 
problems. For this reason, the argument runs, presidential signing statements are more 
valuable because they are inherently reliable as an indication of presidential intent, 
whereas legislative history is less valuable because it is inherently unreliable as an 
indication of congressional intent. 
 
My own view is the same as Justice Scalia's. I believe that the project of statutory 
interpretation is to discern "the original meaning of the text, not what the original 
draftsmen intended."49 And I believe that presidential signing statements like legislative 
history are of very little use in that project. In my view, absent instruction on this 
question from Congress,50 courts should rely on both equally for the strength of their 
reasoning and nothing more. 
 
IV. Legislative Responses 
 
It follows from the analysis above that a general legislative response to the President's 
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use of signing statements is probably unnecessary. Nevertheless, because a bill on this 
topic, H.R. 264,51 has been introduced by Representative Jackson Lee and is now 
pending before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, I shall address the 
balance of my testimony to the constitutionality and the wisdom of such proposals. I shall 
begin with the pending bill, and I will conclude by discussing some other options, 
including the bill that Senator Specter introduced last summer. 
 
A. Limiting Funds for Signing Statements 
 
Section 3(a) of H.R. 264 provides: "None of the funds made available to the Executive 
Office of the President, or to any Executive agency . . . from any source may be used to 
produce, publish, or disseminate any statement made by the President contemporaneously 
with the signing of any bill or joint resolution presented for signing by the President."52 
This provision is probably unconstitutional. 
 
As discussed above, interpreting federal statutes and ensuring uniform interpretation 
throughout the executive branch is at the very core of the President's duty to "take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed."53 And presidential signing statements are an 
essential tool in the performance of that duty. Congress cannot require Executive officials 
that Congress can constitutionally condition creation of a department or the funding of an 
officer's salary on being allowed to appoint the officer."); 4B U.S. Op. Off. Legal 
Counsel 731, 733 (1980) ("It is well established that Congress cannot use its power to 
appropriate money to circumvent general constitutional limitations on congressional 
power."); 41 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 507, 508 (1960) ("Congress cannot by direct action 
compel the President to furnish to it information the disclosure of which he considers 
contrary to the national interest. It cannot achieve this result indirectly by placing a 
condition upon the expenditure of appropriated funds."); 37 U.S. Op. Att'y Gen. 56, 61 
(1933) ("Congress may not, by conditions attached to appropriations, provide for a 
discharge of the functions of Government in a manner not authorized by the 
Constitution."). 
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True, section 3(b) of H.R. 264 would limit the force of the general restriction on funding 
presidential signing statements, providing that it "shall apply only to statements made by 
the President regarding the bill or joint resolution presented for signing that contradict, or 
are inconsistent with, the intent of Congress in enacting the bill or joint resolution or that 
otherwise encroach upon the Congressional prerogative to make laws." But though this 
section purports to limit the force of section 3(a), it actually makes the provision even 
more constitutionally problematic. 
 
Even if Congress could refuse to fund a core executive function altogether, which is 
doubtful in itself,59 it does not follow that Congress may control the discretion inherent 
in a core executive function with a conditional appropriation.60 So for example, it is not 
at all clear that Congress could forbid the President from spending money on a pen and 
ink to issue pardons.61 But even if Congress could do that, it hardly follows that 
Congress could provide a pen and ink for pardons while forbidding that they be used to 
pardon particular individuals.62 Inherent in the President's pardon power is unfettered 
discretion to choose whom to pardon. Just as Congress cannot forbid the pardoning of 
certain people outright, it cannot achieve the same result with a spending restriction. 
Likewise, instructing the executive branch in his interpretation of the law is at the very 
heart of the President's duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."63 If 
Congress may not forbid the President from communicating his will to the executive 
branch whether through a substantive restriction or a spending restriction64 still less may 
it forbid him from communicating some thoughts but not others. 
 
In any event, even setting these constitutional issues aside, section 3(b) is essentially self-
defeating, because it reduces the scope of section 3 to almost nothing. As explained 
above, the vast majority of constitutional signing statements are simple applications of 
the canon of constitutional avoidance, which requires the President to construe statutes, if 
at all possible, to be consistent with the Constitution. As the Court has explained, this 
canon "is followed out of respect for Congress, which we assume legislates in the light of 
constitutional limitations."66 In other words, the premise of the canon is never to 
"contradict, or [be] inconsistent with, the intent of Congress."67 To the contrary, the 
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point of this canon is to choose a constitutional interpretation of ambiguous statutes 
precisely because Congress presumptively intended such interpretations. Thus, virtually 
all the President's signing statements including almost all of the most controversial 
ones68 would be exempt from the spending restriction. In short, this provision would 
have very few applications at all, and even fewer constitutional ones. 
 
At any rate, even if Congress concludes that it does have power to limit appropriations in 
this manner, the separation-of-powers implications are sufficiently serious that it would 
probably be wise to avoid a constitutional confrontation on this point unless absolutely 
necessary. This President's use of signing statements hardly justifies such a 
constitutionally contentious response. 
 
B. Limiting the Interpretive Force of Signing Statements 
 
Section 4 of H.R. 264 is also problematic. It provides: "For purposes of construing or 
applying any Act enacted by the Congress, a governmental entity shall not take into 
consideration any statement made by the President contemporaneously with the 
President's signing of the bill or joint resolution that becomes such Act."69 The term 
"governmental entity" appears to include executive officers, agencies, and courts.70 Each 
of these applications raises distinct constitutional issues. 
 
1. Limiting Federal Official Use of Signing Statements 
 
It follows from the discussion above71 that, insofar as it relates to executive officers and 
agencies, this provision is almost certainly unconstitutional. The provision purports to 
forbid executive officers and agencies from taking into account the President's signing 
statements when interpreting federal law. Such a rule conflicts with the President's 
constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."72 As the Supreme 
Court has explained, "[i ]nterpreting a law enacted by Congress to implement the 
legislative mandate is the very essence of 'execution' of the law," and the President "may 
properly supervise and guide [executive officers'] construction of the statutes under 
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which they act in order to secure that unitary and uniform execution of the laws which 
Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated in vesting general executive power 
in the President alone." The bill would run afoul of this principle, by closing the ears of 
the executive branch to the President's contemporaneous interpretation of the law. For 
that reason alone, it would be unconstitutional. 
 
2. Limiting Judicial Use of Presidential Signing Statements 
 
Once again, the bill provides: "For purposes of construing or applying any Act enacted by 
the Congress, a governmental entity shall not take into consideration any statement made 
by the President contemporaneously with the President's signing of the bill or joint 
resolution that becomes such Act."76 As discussed above, this provision is almost 
certainly unconstitutional to the extent that it applies to executive agencies and 
officers.77 But federal and state courts are also "governmental entit[ies]," and to the 
extent that the provision applies to judicial interpretation, different constitutional issues 
arise. Can Congress forbid courts from using presidential signing statements as an aid in 
the interpretation of federal statutes? This is a rich and difficult question, and to answer 
it, one must begin with the more general question: Can Congress tell courts what tools 
and methods to use when interpreting federal statutes? I considered this question at length 
in the Harvard Law Review five years ago,78 and I concluded that the answer is 
generally yes: Congress does have power to tell courts what methods to use when 
interpreting federal statutes. As I refer in the text only to sections 1 through 4 of Senator 
Specter's bill. Unfortunately, sections 5 and 6 of the bill introduced by Senator Specter 
raise other constitutional questions. Section 5 would have explained, "whatever judicial 
power exists over interpretive methodology must be common lawmaking power, which 
may be trumped by Congress."79 As a general matter, then, Congress has power to 
promulgate general rules of statutory interpretation, which would be binding on state and 
federal courts in the interpretation of federal law. 
 
This is not the end of the analysis, however. Even if Congress generally has power over 
the interpretive methodology employed by courts, "[p]articular interpretive statutes . . . 
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may raise more potent separation-of-powers objections."80 In other words, there is no 
general objection that mandating interpretive rules invades the judicial power, but the 
question remains whether this specific interpretive rule courts shall not rely on 
presidential signing statements in interpreting acts of Congress would impinge on the 
executive power. 
 
I conclude that it probably would not. As explained above,81 the President's executive 
power inherently includes the power to interpret federal law in the first instance.82 
Moreover, the President also has power to give interpretive instructions to executive 
officers.83 But it hardly follows that he has inherent and inalienable power to give such 
instructions to the courts. To be sure, courts often defer to executive agencies in their 
interpretations of federal statutes,84 and the President himself may be entitled to at least 
as much deference,85 but this is so only as long as Congress wishes to acquiesce in this 
rule.86 If Congress wished to forbid judicial deference to agency interpretations or even 
presidential interpretations of federal statutes, it could probably do so. A fortiori, 
Congress could forbid judicial reliance on one manifestation of presidential interpretation 
the presidential signing statement. 
 
Last summer, Senator Specter introduced just such a bill. That bill provided: "In 
determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, no State or Federal court shall rely on 
or defer to a presidential signing statement as a source of authority."87 By restricting its 
application to courts rather than executive officials, this provision would avoid the 
constitutional problems addressed above. 
 
See S. 3731, 5. The scope of Congress's power to grant itself standing to challenge 
executive actions remains in doubt. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. 
MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 149- 55 (5th ed. 2003) (discussing 
Congress's ability to create standing); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829 (1997) (denying 
standing to several members of Congress to challenge the Line Item Veto Act, in part 
because Congress had not authorized them to sue on behalf of the legislative branch); see 
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also Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21, 41-71 (Bork, J., dissenting) (arguing that separation-
of-powers principles prevent the courts from adjudicating disputes raised by Congress in 
response to presidential action). And if Section 5 is constitutionally questionable, then 
section 6 may suffer from a derivative constitutional infirmity. Section 6 would have 
allowed the Senate or House of Representatives to intervene in any suit implicating a 
presidential signing statement. It is an unsettled question whether the Constitution 
requires intervenors to have independent Article III standing. See Diamond v. Charles, 
476 U.S. 54, 68-69 (1986) ("We need not decide today whether a party seeking to 
intervene before a District Court must satisfy not only the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2), 
but also the requirements of Art. III."); Bethune Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 
531 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that questions of intervenor standing have not been settled 
and pointing out problems inherent in granting intervenor standing to parties who do not 
have Article III standing); see also David L. Shapiro, Some Thoughts on Intervention 
Before Courts, Agencies, and Arbitrators, 81 HARV. L. REV. 721, 726-28 (1968) 
(arguing that parties should sometimes be granted permission to intervene despite not 
meeting Article III standing requirements because intervenors need not be given all the 
rights of a party in the case). 
 
The only question remaining is whether such a measure is wise. My tentative answer is 
that it might be, but only as part of a comprehensive legislative scheme. I have argued at 
length that Congress has constitutional power over the tools and methods that courts use 
to interpret federal statutes, and that it should exercise this power.89 But a crucial aspect 
of my thesis is that Congress should approach this project comprehensively. As I 
explained: 
 
The . . . most obvious advantage of a statutory interpretive regime is its potential for 
internal coherence. The Supreme Court is handicapped across this dimension by the 
Article III jurisdictional requirement of a case or controversy. Because the Court can only 
develop canons one by one, common law canons will be devised ad hoc, and will 
inevitably fail to form a coherent set. [By contrast,] [c ]ongressionally adopted canons 
could form a true "regime" a set of background interpretive principles with internal 
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logical coherence.90 Indeed, the bill introduced by Senator Specter made much the same 
point, finding that "Congress can and should exercise [its] power over the interpretation 
of Federal statutes in a systematic and comprehensive manner."91 This is absolutely 
right, and I urge the House to undertake precisely this project. In short, I applaud 
Congress's interest in a federal rule of statutory interpretation addressing presidential 
signing statements, but I think such a rule should ideally be adopted as part of a coherent 
and comprehensive code. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, the recent brouhaha over presidential signing statements is largely 
unwarranted. Presidential signing statements are an appropriate means by which the 
President fulfills his constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed."92 And even the most controversial ones are, in truth, nothing more than the 
application of the well- settled canon of constitutional avoidance a canon which, as Chief 
Justice John Marshall explained, was born of "a just respect for the legislature." 
 
I do not believe that any legislative response to the President's use of signing statements 
is necessarily called for. And I believe that the bill pending before the House Committee 
on Oversight and Government Reform has deep constitutional flaws. If some legislative 
response is thought necessary, I would recommend something akin to sections 1 through 
4 of the bill introduced last summer by Senator Specter,94 which would forbid state and 
federal courts, but not executive officials, from relying on presidential signing statements 
as a source of authority in the interpretation of federal statutes.95 Better still, I would 
urge Congress to follow Senator Specter's exhortation to "exercise th[e] power over the 
interpretation of Federal statutes in a systematic and comprehensive manner,"96 by 
incorporating any such provision into coherent and codified federal rules of statutory 
interpretation. 
